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Abstract
This paper explores the interdependence between market structure and an im-
portant class of extra-rational cognitive biases. Starting with a familiar bilateral
monopoly framework, we characterize the endogenous emergence of preference dis-
tortions during bargaining which cause negotiators to perceive their private val-
uations differently than they would outside the adversarial negotiation context.
Using this model, we then demonstrate how a number of external interventions in
the structure and/or organization of market interactions (occurring before trade,
after trade, or during negotiations themselves) can profoundly alter the nature of
these dispositions. Our results demonstrate that many such interventions fre-
quently (though not always) share qualitatively similar characteristics to market
interventions that are often proposed for overcoming more conventional forms of
market failure. Nevertheless, our analysis underscores the importance of under-
standing the precise link between cognitive failures and market structure prior to
the implementation any particular proposed reform.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the rational actor model – pivotal to much of modern economic theory
– has fallen under renewed criticism from scholars both inside and outside economics
proper. By at least some accounts, this scrutiny is long overdue: Indeed, there are scores
of examples where observed behavior appears strikingly at odds with at least the most
straightforward predictions of models with strong rationality assumptions. The growing
literature in behavioral economics is largely dedicated to cataloguing and systematizing
instances in which preferences are internally inconsistent, dynamically unstable, or actu-
arially biased. Examples of such phenomena include overconfidence, endowment effects,
framing effects, self-serving biases, heuristics, cycling, and various forms of bounded ra-
tionality (see e.g. Rabin (1998) for an overview).
Given the ascendancy of this literature, there is a natural urge to transcend the posi-
tive connections between decision-making problems and cognitive biases, and to explore
the normative consequences that such phenomena imply. Not surprisingly, a number of
recent efforts in the literature appear to do just that, using topics within behavioral eco-
nomics as springboards for proposing market interventions or legal reforms that attempt
to compensate for the existence of cognitive preference distortions. Sunstein (2002) for
example, considers how elimination of at-will employment doctrine may help address
problems with endowment effects. 1
These accounts view cognitive biases as an exogenous assumption within a behavioral
model, and take preferences (distorted by biases) to be a primitive building block of equi-
librium behavior. Such an assumption, however, stands in contrast with the experimental
evidence, which suggests that many cognitive dispositions appear to be highly context
specific, rising to first-order importance in certain settings, while curiously marginal in
others (Camerer et al. 2003). Thus, without a more general theory of context, it is
difficult to predict how (or whether) various biases occurring in the laboratory should
translate to the real world targets of policy reforms, and how these biases may be affected
by such interventions.
In this paper, we propose a model for analyzing how context and cognition plausibly
interact with one another, and a resulting framework for studying institutional design
within such a setting. Our analysis reveals that the task of designing institutions in the
presence of cognitive biases is somewhat more complicated than in the classical approach
to design problems, for at least two reasons. First (and most centrally), regulatory
interventions themselves are likely to distort context, and in so doing may affect the
direction or magnitude of various cognitive dispositions. When contemplating issues of
institutional design and policy, then, one must take care not only to identify the biases
which cause inefficiencies, but also to anticipate the feedback effects induced by the very
1Other examples include Jolls (1998) who argues that wealth redistribution is more efficiently accom-
plished through legal liability rules than through tax and trasnfer systems, since people systematically
underestimate the likelihood of legal liability.
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regulatory apparatus meant to compensate for them. Such feedback effects are frequently
not incorporated into normative policy proposals, and their omission could very well lead
to imprecise, inefficient, and ultimately ineffectual reforms.
Second, even if one could anticipate the feedback effects described above, a particu-
larly thorny problem remains in specifying a reasonable definition of “optimality” in the
presence of endogenous preferences. Indeed, conventional notions of economic welfare
become more contested in environments where preferences themselves shift over time
(see, e.g., Carmichael & MacLeod (2002)). As we demonstrate below, the nature of an
optimal regulatory intervention may turn dramatically on whether one defines optimality
in terms of a context-specific or context-independent definition of preferences.
The analytic model we propose is one in which cognitive dispositions – much like
behavior itself – arise endogenously, through an equilibrium process. This approach
draws from a recent literature2 whose origins trace back (at least) to Becker (1976),
and which hinges on the commitment value of preferences: i.e., it may “pay” to be
concerned with motives other than one’s own wealth, since so doing can induce other
actors to make favorable accommodations in their equilibrium behavior. Ultimately,
holding the economic environment constant, the interaction between individual biases
and this responsive accommodation by others can generate a stable equilibrium both in
preferences and in behavior. Accordingly, when the underlying economic environment
governing the interaction changes, preferences and behavior will both adjust as well.
The linchpin of the equilibration process we posit is an assumption that those who
adopt preference dispositions yielding larger material rewards (as measured by their
context-independent preferences) also tend to become more prominent in the population
of players. While this equilibrating process is certainly reminiscent of literal evolution-
ary equilibrium concepts, it is significantly broader than that. The same account, for
example, would also apply to situations where individuals simply imitated and adopted
the attitudes and norms of those who appear to be successful over the long term, thereby
reducing the economic influence of others. This concept of preference equilibrium is a
natural embarking point for an economic analysis of preference endogeneity, since (1) it
is grounded in first principles rather than exogenous assumptions about biases; and (2)
it ultimately subscribes to the notion that individuals adapt in a way which is beneficial
to their own, genuine welfare (albeit indirectly and unconsciously).
In order to illustrate the application of our framework, we explore its consequences in
what is perhaps the most fundamental arena of economic interaction: bilateral exchange.
Using a familiar, canonical framework of noncooperative bargaining with two-sided pri-
2Samuelson (2001) presents a brief overview of this literature, while Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (1998)
and Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2003) present general results in this vein. Examples include Güth
and Yaari (1992), Huck and Oechssler (1998), Fershtman and Weiss (1997, 1998), Rotemberg (1994),
Bester and Güth (1998), Possajennikov (2000), Bolle (2000), Bergman and Bergman (2000), Koçkesen,
Ok, and Sethi (2000a, 2000b), Guttmann (2000), Sethi and Somanathan (2001), Kyle and Wang (1997),
Benos (1998), Heifetz and Segev (2001).
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vate information as a benchmark (e.g., Myerson & Satterthwaite 1983), we characterize
the emergence of preference distortions during bargaining that cause negotiators to skew
their perceived private values away from those they would perceive outside the bargaining
context. Such preference distortions are commonly observed in the experimental litera-
ture, often associated with the “endowment effect,” the “self-serving bias,” or both. We
demonstrate how such cognitive dispositions can benefit private negotiators, effectively
transforming them into “tougher” bargainers than they would be in the absence of bias,
thereby augmenting the credibility of their threat to exit without an agreement. More-
over, based on the analysis in Heifetz and Segev (2001) we illustrate how such transitory
preference distortions are a viable equilibrium trait within a population of parties who
bargain in thin market settings, identifying the emerging preference-behavior equilibrium
as a function of the bargaining scheme.
We then turn our attention to the question of optimal institutional design. Using
the bilateral bargaining framework described above as a template, we demonstrate how
various market interventions – either by the state or by a benevolent third party – can
have profound effects on both the existence and magnitude of transitory preference dis-
tortions during negotiation. Accounting for these effects can cause an optimal regulatory
scheme to differ (sometimes dramatically) from that in which cognitive dispositions were
either assumed away or treated as exogenous primitives. To our knowledge, this is the
first systematic attempt to consider the prescriptive interrelationship between cognition,
context, and market design.
Significantly, the market interventions we analyze are not merely fanciful figments of
our collective imagination, but rather real-world mechanisms through which third parties
can (and do) exercise regulatory power at various points in the bargaining process. In
particular, we focus on three genres of actual market intervention (differentiated by the
time at which regulation occurs) that strike us as particularly salient:
• Ex post intervention. A number of institutional devices exist for rewarding
traders upon reaching a negotiated outcome. For example, various elements of
the tax code often act to subsidize the consummated bargains.3 This approach
is also increasingly common in the international arena, as funding sources (such
as the World Bank) have begun to de-emphasize the importance of demonstrating
economic need, basing their funding decisions more centrally on a model of re-
warding the resolution of international conflicts and the implementation of internal
agreements to distribute aid effectively.4
• Interim intervention. Other forms of regulatory intervention occur at the nego-
tiation process itself, artificially constraining the types of bargains that are allowed.
3See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 17053.84 (paying a 15% tax credit for the purchase and installation
of solar energy equipment by California residents).
4See, e.g., Dollar (2000).
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In contract law, for example, numerous legal rules (such as the doctrines of con-
sideration and unconscionability in contract law, and the doctrine of moeities in
admiralty law) operate to narrow the range of enforceable bargaining outcomes
relative to what the parties would find individually rational. In addition, in some
circumstances price/wage ceilings and floors operate with a similar constraining
effect.
• Ex ante intervention. Still other regulatory interventions take place before bar-
gaining even begins, at the point in which initial property rights are assigned. A
substantial portion of common law doctrines and statutory provisions are dedi-
cated to specifying the contours of individual property rights, ranging from strong
monolithic entitlements protected by injunctive relief, to weak entitlements that are
either protected solely with damages or are subject to joint ownership (e.g., Ayres
& Talley 1995). Individuals frequently negotiate transfers of title in the shadow of
these entitlements.
Within each of these examples, we show how an optimal regulatory intervention would
account not only for garden variety market failures, but also for the endogenous cognitive
shifts that regulatory interventions themselves can trigger. In so doing, we highlight how
many of the now-accepted approaches for mitigating strategic barriers to trade might fare
once cognitive barriers are also taken into account.
In some instances, the fit is a poor one. For example, while subsidizing successful
trades (i.e., ex post intervention) has long been recognized as a method for counteract-
ing the effects of strategic behavior by privately-informed parties, we demonstrate that
such subsidy schemes can themselves aggravate transitory preference shifts. As a result,
optimal market design in the presence of endogenous cognitive biases may require a sig-
nificantly greater amount of intervention in the market (i.e., a higher subsidy rate) than
would be necessary in an environment where agents were devoid of such distortions.5
Less pessimistically, we demonstrate that there are some forms of intervention in which
strategic and cognitive concerns overlap. For instance, we show how “weak” property
entitlements (such as joint ownership or “fuzzy” property rights) not only help to mitigate
strategic misrepresentation (e.g., Cramton, Gibbons & Klemperer (1987); Ayres & Talley
(1995)), but they can also help to dissipate cognitive dispositions towards toughness.
In a similar vein, we find that interim interventions constraining the types of allowed
bargains, typically devised to secure incentives in the process of information exchange,
also help in mitigating transitory cognitive shifts. However, it turns out that excessive
such intervention — beyond the extent prescribed in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) —
5This particular result turns on the social planner attempting to maximize a-contextual preferences.
However, as we show below, regardless of what the social planner attempts maximize, the optimal subsidy
will generally diverge (either above or below) that of a classical analysis in which biases are assumed
away.
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will in fact make the traders happiest in expectation given the endogenous level of these
shifts.
Our analysis illustrates also the second obstacle in conducting market design in the
presence of cognitive biases: the elusive meaning of the term “optimal.” Indeed, in a
situation where individual preferences are prone to endogenous shifts, utilitarian notions
such as efficiency become significantly more indeterminate than they are in traditional
rational choice theory. In particular, one might justifiably choose to focus on a notion
of welfare rooted in a-contextual preferences (what we shall intermittently refer to as
“wealth”), corresponding to those preferences individuals manifest in the abstract, out-
side of an adversarial bargaining context. Alternatively, one might conceive of welfare
rooted in their preferences during trade (what we shall intermittently refer to as “happi-
ness”), corresponding to those that individuals would perceive through their transitory
preference dispositions at the point of bargaining. As we demonstrate below, this dis-
tinction is an important issue for policy design, as wealth and happiness maximizing
approaches frequently point at divergent institutional structures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a general frame-
work for institutional design problems in the presence of endogenous dispositions. Section
3 applies this framework to the case of bilateral exchange with private information, as in
Heifetz and Segev (2001). We start by deriving the dependence of the equilibrium dispo-
sitions on the bargaining mechanism, and demonstrate how this idea is operationalized in
a particular bargaining equilibrium. Section 4 then turns to our constructive enterprise,
demonstrating (ad seriatim) how ex post, interim, and ex ante interventions into market
structure can affect the existence and degree of preference distortions during bargain-
ing. We characterize the optimal regulatory intervention under the alternative goals of
maximizing actual gains from trade (“wealth”) versus maximizing the gains from trade
as the traders perceive them to be during trade (the traders’ “happiness”). We compare
not only these optimal interventions to one another, but also against the baseline case in
which cognitive dispositions were wholly absent. Section 5 concludes, and the Appendix
provides the proofs of the propositions.
2 General Framework: the design of institutions when
design affects preferences
In this section we describe a general framework to evaluate institutional design when
preferences of individuals may be endogenously sensitive to this design. The next two
sections apply these ideas to the case of bilateral exchange with private information.
Let O be a set of outcomes pertaining to the individuals i ∈ I. Let Ui be a set of
utility functions Ui : O → R that individual i may have. We denote by U = (Ui)i∈I a
utility profile of the individuals. The set of utility profiles is U =Qi∈I Ui.
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Let there be a welfare aggregation function W : U → U, where U is also a set of
utility functions U : O → R. That is, for each utility profile U, W (U) : O → R is a
utility function itself.
The strategies available to individual i ∈ I are Si, and S =
Q
i∈I Si is the set of
possible strategy profiles. A mechanism is a function µ : S → O, which specifies an
outcome for each strategy profile of the individuals. When the individuals have the
utility profile U, a strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a Nash Equilibrium of the mechanism µ if
for each individual i ∈ I
Ui (µ (s
∗)) ≥ Ui
¡
µ
¡
si, s
∗
−i
¢¢
(2.1)
for every strategy si ∈ Si. As usual,
¡
si, s
∗
−i
¢
denotes the strategy profile obtained from
s∗ by replacing only the strategy s∗i of individual i by si.
LetM be the set of available mechanisms. We assume that for every utility profile
U ∈ U there exists a mechanism µ ∈M which has a Nash equilibrium for U. For every
mechanism µ ∈M for which this is the case, we assume that one Nash equilibrium for
U is singled out, and denoted by s∗ (U, µ) .
An institutional design is a mapD : U →M such that for every utility profile U ∈ U ,
the mechanism D (U) has a Nash equilibrium for U. The induced outcome is then
o (U,D) = D (U) (s∗ (U,D (U))) (2.2)
We denote by D the collection of available designs.
For a given utility profile U, the classical problem of institutional design consists
of choosing a design D ∈ D so as to maximize W (U) (o (U,D)) for every U ∈ U . In
words, the challenge is to find, for every utility profile U ∈ U , the mechanism such
that the outcome induced by that mechanism at its Nash equilibrium will maximize the
aggregate welfare.
However, given the abundance of evidence on the sensitivity of preferences to context,
it may very well be the case that the design itself also has an unconscious effect on the
individuals’ preferences. We therefore assume that in the context induced by the design
D, an individual with a utility function Ui will unconsciously try to maximize UDi rather
than Ui. Thus, the institution will ultimately impose the mechanism D
¡
UD
¢
rather than
D (U) , and the implemented outcome will be o
¡
UD,D
¢
rather than o (U,D) .
How does the utility profile adapt to the institutional design D? That is, how is the
map U → UD determined? If we are to assume an unconscious adaptation of preferences
to context, it is first of all natural to assume that such an adaptation cannot be too
“wild”, but rather constrained to some “neighborhood” of specific distortions of the
original preferences. Formally, we therefore assume that for each utility function Ui ∈ Ui
there corresponds a set of utility distortions N (Ui) ⊆ Ui, which contains Ui and from
which UDi can emerge.
How is UDi ultimately singled out ofN (U)? Here it is natural to assume that while the
distortion from Ui to UDi is not the result of a conscious process, U
D
i eventually adjusts
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so as to maximize the base utility Ui given the institution D and the emerging utility
functions UDj of the other individuals j 6= i. Formally, denote by
³
U˜i, U
D
−i
´
the utility
profile one obtains from UDi by replacing only the utility function U
D
i of individual i by
U˜i. Then we say that UD is a preference equilibrium utility profile within the institutional
design D if for every individual i ∈ I
UDi ∈ arg max
U˜i∈N (U)
Ui
³
o
³³
U˜i, U
D
−i
´
,D
´´
(2.3)
In other words, UD is a Nash equilibrium of a meta-game with the strategy space N (Ui)
for individual i ∈ I and the payoff function fi :
Q
i∈I N (Ui)→ R defined by
fi
³
U˜
´
= Ui
³
o
³
U˜ ,D
´´
(2.4)
Typically, the preference equilibrium utility profile UD indeed varies with D and is dif-
ferent than U. Intuitively, this is because the distortion from Ui towards UDi shifts the
Nash equilibrium behavior of the other individuals from s∗−i
¡¡
Ui, U
D
−i
¢
,D
¡
Ui, U
D
−i
¢¢
to
s∗−i
¡
UD,D
¡
UD
¢¢
, both directly — through the first argument of s∗−i, and also indirectly,
via the effect on the mechanism implemented in the institution D — the second argu-
ment of s∗−i. This effect on others’ equilibrium behavior may more than compensate the
individual for the fact that her own equilibrium choice s∗i
¡
UD,D
¡
UD
¢¢
maximizes UDi
rather than her genuine Ui.
This approach to endogenous preferences is by now well established in the literature.
It dates back at least to the seminal approach of Becker (1976) (e.g. the “rotten kid
theorem”, which exemplified the commitment value of altruism), and elaborated further
in the numerous contributions cited in footnote 2. In particular, many of these contribu-
tions analyzed the evolutionary viability of equilibrium preferences, and showed that they
are either evolutionary stable in the space of preferences represented by the utility func-
tions in (N (Ui))i∈I , or, even stronger, the sole survivors in any regular payoff-monotonic
selection process in which preferences with higher fitness (with the fitness function fi in
(2.4) ) proliferate at the expense of less fit preferences.
This effect of the institutional design on the very preferences that the individuals try
to maximize raises a new question regarding the object of social maximization. Should the
design be chosen so as to maximize W (U) ¡o ¡UD,D¢¢ or rather W ¡UD¢ ¡o ¡UD,D¢¢?
The former approach is based on the assumption that the preference shifts from Ui to
UDi are transitory and short-lived, and welfare should be evaluated according to the base
utility profile U. The latter approach aims at maximizing the aggregate welfare of the
individuals according to their utility profile UD, i.e. according to their preferences when
they interact within the institution. The analysis in this paper will address both these
approaches.
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3 Bilateral Exchange with Endogenous Preferences
We now proceed to analyze how the general framework of the previous section can be
applied to the case of bilateral exchange with private information, as in Heifetz and Segev
(2001).
Consider a bilateral monopoly between a potential seller (denoted as S) and buyer
(denoted as B), who bargain over an undifferentiated good or legal entitlement. Both
parties possess private information about their true valuations of the entitlement, but
it is commonly known that these core valuations are drawn independently from uniform
distributions on the same support [a, a¯] , which we normalize to be [0, 1].6 When we say
that the core valuation of the seller is s, we mean that this is the minimal price for which
she would be willing to sell the good were she to trade in some market as a price-taker.
Similarly, the core valuation b of the buyer is the maximal price he would be willing to
pay for the good as a price-taker.
The bargaining scheme, however complicated, eventually gives rise to some probability
of trade p(s, b) for each pair of seller and buyer valuations s, b ∈ [0, 1], and an average
monetary transfer t(s, b) from the buyer to the seller given trade. The ex ante probability
of trade is therefore given by
P =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
p(s, b)dsdb, (3.1)
and the ex ante expected gains from trade are
G =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(b− s) p(s, b)dsdb. (3.2)
which can be decomposed into
G = U + V
where
U =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(t(s, b)− s) p(s, b)dsdb
V =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(b− t(s, b)) p(s, b)dsdb.
are the seller and buyer’s expected payoffs, respectively.
Introducing cognitive dispositions during trade, we now assume that each of the
parties may be subject to a preference drift in the course of bargaining, manifested by an
6To ease the exposition, we pursue the analysis with the uniform distribution, though a similar
analysis can be carried out also with more general distributions — see Heifetz and Segev (2001) for
details.
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additive distortion of its valuation. In particular, we assume that the seller’s perceived
valuation of the entitlement consists of s + ε, which represents the sum of her core
valuation (s) and a distortion component (ε). Similarly, the buyer’s perceived valuation
of the entitlement consists of b − τ , which represents the difference between his core
valuation (b) and a distortion component (τ). Intuitively, ε and τ represent a type of
emotional bargaining “toughness” exhibited by each side. Although the seller’s “genuine”
valuation of the entitlement is s, when bargaining over a sale she becomes convinced that
her true valuation is ε dollars higher still. Similarly, the buyer becomes convinced that
his valuation is τ dollars lower than his true valuation b.
Such distortions have both empirical and theoretical justifications for coming about.
Empirically, there is a vast and growing literature exploring the so-called “endowment
effect” in bargaining, which operates much like the toughness distortion envisioned here
[see Horowitz and McConnel (2002) or Arlen, Spitzer & Talley (2002) for a literature
survey]. Theoretically, the above distortions may play a valuable role in enhancing
each side’s expected payoff during bargaining. Indeed, if each party to a negotiation
perceives herself to possess a more “stingy” valuation than she would possess outside the
bargaining context, and this perception is observed by the other bargaining party, then
the preference distortion can, ironically, enhance her expected payoff (when viewed from
the standpoint of her genuine, a-contextual preferences).
We therefore assume in what follows that the supports of the perceived-valuations —
[ε, 1+ ε] for the seller and [−τ , 1− τ ] for the buyer — are commonly known, but we allow
for them to be endogenously determined over time as part of a preference equilibrium.
How is this equilibrium determined?
For any given toughness dispositions ε, τ , trade takes place with a positive probability
only when the true valuation s of the seller is in fact smaller than 1−τ −ε,7 and the true
valuation b of the buyer is larger than τ + ε.8 We assume that the original bargaining
mechanism, as characterized by the trade probability p(s, b) and transfer t(s, b) functions,
is simply re-scaled to these new intervals of smaller length 1−τ−ε. The overall probability
of trade thus shrinks toZ 1
0
µZ 1
0
p(s, b)(1− τ − ε)ds
¶
(1− τ − ε) db = P (1− τ − ε)2 (3.3)
and the ex ante gains from trade (as perceived by the bargaining parties) decrease toZ 1
0
µZ 1
0
((1− τ − ε) (b− s)) p(s, b) (1− τ − ε) ds
¶
(1− τ − ε)db = G(1− τ − ε)3. (3.4)
Of this amount, U(1− τ − ε)3 is enjoyed by the seller and the remaining V (1− τ − ε)3
by the buyer.
7That is, when her perceived valuation S is smaller than 1 − τ , which is the maximal perceived
valuation of the buyer.
8That is, when his perceived valuation B is higher than ε — the minimal perceived valuation of the
seller.
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Note, however, that the private payoffs characterized above are expressed in terms of
each bargaining party’s preferences she perceives herself to have from within the bargain-
ing context. Of equal importance is how these distortions affect the parties “genuine”
payoffs away from the bargaining context. Under this metric, the “true” profit of the
seller reaps increases by ε for every transaction she successfully consummates (reflecting
the abandonment of her transitory cognitive attachment to the entitlement). As such,
the seller’s a-contextual payoff in the above game in expected value terms is given by:
fseller(ε, τ) = U(1− τ − ε)3 + P (1− τ − ε)2ε (3.5)
Similarly, the “genuine” ex ante expected profit of the buyer increases by τ for every
successfully-consummated transaction, becoming:
fbuyer(τ , ε) = V (1− τ − ε)3 + P (1− τ − ε)2τ . (3.6)
Consequently, the a-contextual joint surplus of the parties is given by:
g (ε, τ) = G(1− τ − ε)3 + P (1− τ − ε)2 (ε+ τ) (3.7)
Definition 1 The bargainers preferences are at equilibrium, if each bargainer’s prefer-
ences confer the highest expected actual payoff given the preferences of the other bargainer,
i.e. if the seller’s “endowment effect” ε∗ maximizes her expected payoff given the “tough-
ness disposition” τ ∗ of the buyer, and vice versa.
In other words, (ε∗, τ ∗) are equilibrium dispositions if they constitute a Nash equilib-
rium of the meta-game with payoffs fseller, fbuyer, which is straightforward to compute:
Proposition 1 When U
P
, V
P
< 1
3
, the dispositions with the equilibrium preferences are
ε∗ =
P − 3U
P + 3 (P −G)
τ ∗ =
P − 3V
P + 3 (P −G)
In fact, a sharper result obtains: In a population of individuals who are repeatedly
matched at random to bargain, the preferences will indeed converge to having these
levels ε∗, τ ∗ of the dispositions under any dynamic process that rewards material success
with proliferation, for a genuinely wide range of initial distributions of preferences in the
population. The proof of this theorem and the exact phrasing and proof of the sharper
result requires few more technical definitions, and can be found in Heifetz and Segev
(2001).
To grasp the meaning of the conditions U
P
, V
P
< 1
3
(and hence G
P
< 2
3
), notice that
(by (3.1) and (3.2) ) it is always the case that P ≤ G, and the two quantities become
11
closer to one another when the probability of trade p(s, b) decreases when b− s is small,
and increases when b− s is large.9 Therefore, the condition G
P
< 2
3
means that the trade
scheme allows for “a fair chance to strike even fairly profitable deals.”10
Even though a tough spirit or character in the course of bargaining is unilaterally
beneficial, and hence both bargainers adapt to such a tough mood during the bargaining
process, these tendencies constitutes a Prisoners’ Dilemma type of inefficiency:
Proposition 2 The parties might be better off without the distortion than with it, i.e.
there are values for ε and τ such that G ≥ g (ε, τ) . In particular they are better off
without the equilibrium distortion than with it, i.e. G ≥ g (ε∗, τ ∗) .
Proof: In the Appendix.
Thus, in terms of their a-contextual preferences (and a fortiori in terms of the traders’
preferences in the heat of bargaining), cognitive biases might make both parties worse
off than they would be if such biases were nonexistent. It is in precisely such instances
that there may be a case for some form of measured paternalism, either by the state
or by some other benevolent third party. Mitigating the cognitive shifts during trade is
thus a new task for a social planner, on top of the classical task of mitigating strategic
misrepresentation. In section 4 we shall explore how various measures of intervention
perform in obtaining this duo of goals simultaneously.
3.1 An Example: Sealed-bid Double Auctions
In order to illustrate how the above characterization of equilibrium preferences is opera-
tionalized, consider the canonical bargaining problem presented in Chatterjee & Samuel-
son (1983). Within their model there is a unique Bayes-Nash linear strategy equilibrium
profile in which strategies are strictly increasing in type. In the case of equal bargaining
power and uniform distributions on
£
S, S
¤× £B,B¤, a seller with valuation s offers:
σ (s) =
2
3
s+
1
4
B +
1
12
S, (3.8)
and a buyer with valuation b bids:
β (b) =
2
3
b+
1
12
B +
1
4
S. (3.9)
9P = G only in the limiting case when trade takes place with a positive probability exclusively when
b− s = 1, i.e. b = 1 and s = 0.
10If we restrict attention to Incentice-Compatibe (IC) and Individually-Rational (IR) trade mecha-
nisms (i.e. Budget-Balanced (BB)), substituting the uniform distributions into inequality (2) of Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) yields that such mechanisms must satisfy GP ≥
1
2 . Thus, our condition is com-
patible with (IC),(IR) and (BB). Moreover, virtually all the particular equilibria of bargaining games
we found in the literature satisfy the restriction GP <
2
3 (see Heifetz and Segev 2001 for details).
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Consequently, trade occurs only when
b ≥ s+ 1
4
¡
B − S
¢
. (3.10)
When normalizing the intervals over the unit square, this condition has the familiar shape
b ≥ s+ 1
4
,
and thus trade need not occur even when it is efficient. The total gains from trade in
this case are given by:
G =
Z 3
4
0
Z 1
s+ 1
4
(b− s)dbds = 9
64
,
U = V = 1
2
G = 9
128
; and finally, the probability of trade is given by:
P =
Z 3
4
0
Z 1
s+ 1
4
dbds =
9
32
The equilibrium biases are therefore11
ε∗ =
P − 3U
P + 3 (P −G) =
1
10
(3.11)
τ ∗ =
P − 3V
P + 3 (P −G) =
1
10
(3.12)
It turns out that with these biases the ex ante probability of trade becomes: P (1−
τ ∗ − ε∗)2 = 9
50
which is of course smaller than this probability without the biases
(P ), and the ex ante total gains from trade are also reduced to G(1 − τ ∗ − ε∗)3 +
P (1− τ ∗ − ε∗)2 (ε∗ + τ ∗) = 27
250
. Thus we see that in this case not only that the traders
are better off without the distortions than with it (judged by their a-contextual pref-
erences) but also the equilibrium strategies in the presence of the biases induce a less
efficient mechanism.
11To make the computations more explicit, observe that with biases ε, τ , trade can take place only
when the perceived valuations S,B are in the interval
£
S,B
¤
= [ε, 1−τ ]. Hence, by (3.10), the probability
of trade becomesZ B− 14(B−S)
S
Z B
S+ 14 (B−S)
dBdS =
Z (1−τ)− 14 (1−τ−ε)
ε
Z 1−τ
S+ 14 (1−τ−ε)
dBdS = 9
32
(1− τ − ε)2
and the perceived gains from trade areZ (1−τ)− 14 (1−τ−ε)
ε
Z 1−τ
S+ 14 (1−τ−ε)
(B − S) dBdS = 9
64
(1− τ − ε)3
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4 Efficient Market Design
Because the existence of endogenous bargaining toughness creates a prima facie case for
external intervention, we turn now to exploring the question of what form that interven-
tion might take. As noted in the introduction, we consider three possible candidates,
differentiated by the time period in which the social planner enters: intervention ex post,
at the interim stage, or at the ex ante stage. For each case, moreover, we consider
alternative efficiency definitions using, respectively, the players’ a-contextual preferences
(which we have labeled “wealth”) on the one hand, and their contextualized, “hot” pref-
erences (labeled “happiness”) on the other. Although our analysis will focus on the
example developed in the previous section, it is easily generalizable.
4.1 Ex post intervention: Subsidizing Trade
It has long been recognized in the bargaining literature that strategic barriers to trade
can be reduced — and even eliminated — through an appropriately crafted ex post subsidy.
Under such a scheme, a third party insurer promises to pay a subsidy to the bargainers
should they successfully consummate a transaction. If the subsidy is sufficiently large, it
can counteract the incentives that players might otherwise have to extract information
rents by threatening to walk out on the negotiations. The effect can be so pronounced
as to eliminate completely the generic inefficiency that frequently attends bilateral bar-
gaining (Myerson & Satterthwaite (1983)).
The attraction to trade subsidies, moreover, is more than a theoretical curiosity.
Indeed, a number of legal and institutional mechanisms plausibly serve the very purpose
of subsidizing successful bargaining outcomes. While a complete list of them is beyond
the scope of this article, a few notable examples are as follows:
• Tax Incentives: In state and federal tax law, there are typical deductions and
credits that are allowed for certain categories of market purchases.12
• Bankruptcy Costs: When a firm becomes financially distressed, it is generally
agreed that the option of filing for bankruptcy adds considerable costs on the filing
party and its creditors (Baird, Jackson & Adler (2000)). The significant costs due
to bankruptcy have created substantial motivation for “private workouts” among
debtors, their shareholders, and creditors. From a conceptual perspective, then, a
successful workout allows the parties to forego a considerable cost, the savings of
which can now be split among them. As such, the costs of bankruptcy effectively
act as a type of subsidy for successful bargaining.
• Conditionality in International Aid: As noted above, numerous donor institutions
(e.g., the IMF, World Bank) condition their aid on the resolution of internal or
12See footnote 3 above.
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international conflicts.13 During the last decade of the 20th century, the amount of
international assistance directly tied to the resolution of such conflicts amounted
to more than $ 25 billion (Forman and Patrick 2000, p. 10).
• Anti-Insurance: Cooter and Porat (2002) have suggested greater use of “anti-
insurance” to mitigate incentive problems in joint ventures. Under one example
of such a scheme, business partners would execute a contingent debt contract with
a third party that would bind the firm to pay off the principal when the firm’s
profits are low, but excuses the obligation when profits are high. (Because this
type of insurance contract increases the volatility of the firm’s cash flow, it has been
dubbed “anti-insurance”). Although the idea behind anti-insurance is to provide
efficient investment incentives on the margin, the same concept might be used to
finance an insurance scheme that is triggered with contract negotiations, collective
bargaining agreements, or other situations in which bargaining is successful.
Endogenous cognitive dispositions can significantly complicate the considerations un-
derlying an optimal subsidy. Indeed, while continuing to dampen the parties’ strategic
incentives to misrepresent value, trade subsidies simultaneously raise the absolute size of
the bargaining surplus available. This latter effect causes the parties to develop even
tougher dispositions than they would have in the absence of subsidies, since a larger
surplus enhances the returns that one derives from being committed to a tough mood.
Consequently, the optimal subsidy policy will generally have to trade off desirable strate-
gic repercussions with less desirable cognitive ones, and will therefore generally diverge
from that implied in a wealth-maximizing actor model.
In order to make the appropriate comparisons, we first consider the optimal trade
subsidies in the benchmark case, in which cognitive biases are wholly absent by definition.
To focus on intuitions, we restrict attention to the special case in which the expected
split of the surplus between the parties is symmetric (U = V = G
2
). In such a situation,
the optimal subsidy scheme generally awards an equal payment to each party upon the
consummation of a transaction. Consider, then, the effects of a subsidy α paid to each
trader when and only when a trade is consummated. To facilitate welfare comparisons,
we shall assume that the cost of the subsidy is wholly internalized ex ante, financed by
an ex ante head tax whose size is equal to the expected subsidy paid across all possible
valuations.14
The inclusion of the subsidy causes the set of mutually advantageous trades to expand
by α for each party. Thus, if the interval with gains from trade is originally of length z,
its length increases by the total subsidy of 2α to become z+2α. In this case, the optimal
13Dollar (2000). There is some precedent for this change. Indeed, one of the benefits accrued to Egypt
by signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 is sustained financial support from the US.
14The assumption of self-finance ex ante is not critical. However, regardless of whether the subsidy
is self financed or financed by a social insurance scheme, the expected cost of the subsidy is a relevant
component of social welfare.
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subsidy is that which maximizes the expected total gains of the parties less the cost of
the subsidy:15
α∗ = argmax
α
£
G(1 + 2α)3 − 2αP (1 + 2α)2
¤
=
1
6
3G− P
P −G (4.1)
and the eventual expected surplus is
G(1 + 2α∗)3 − 2α∗P (1 + 2α∗)2 = 4
27
P 3
(P −G)2
(4.2)
In the numerical example above (whereG = 9
64
and P = 9
32
), this implies that a subsidy of
α∗ = 1
6
is required in order to maximize the actual expected surplus. After accounting for
their ex ante tax burden, the expected gains from trade will be G = 1
6
, which represents
an increase from G = 9
64
in the absence of the subsidy.
4.1.1 Wealth-Maximizing Subsidies
With this benchmark in hand, we turn to analyze the effects of the endogenous cognitive
dispositions. Consider first a social planner whose aim is to craft a subsidy to maximize
the expected wealth of the parties. Under this approach, the social planner’s problem
must now account for the fact that the preference shifts ε, τ , will generally depend on the
subsidy level and eventually adjust to it. Consequently, an optimal trade subsidy must
take this endogeneity into account, as reflected by the following proposition (whose proof
can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 3 With endogenous preferences, a wealth-maximizing social planner will
choose a subsidy of
α∗∗ =
1
6
P
P −G
in order to maximize the expected gains from trade, which is larger than the optimal
subsidy in the benchmark case. The equilibrium dispositions under this subsidy are
ε∗∗ = τ ∗∗ = (1 + 2α∗∗)
2P − 3G
2P + 6 (P −G) ,
which are larger than those which would emerge without the subsidy. However, the
eventual expected surplus will be the same as in the benchmark case with no dispositions
—
4
27
P 3
(P −G)2
15In the computations below, the first term is the sum of the ex ante profits of the seller and the buyer,
and the second term is the tax.
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The intuition behind this result is relatively straightforward. Because the subsidy
marginally increases the aggregate bargaining surplus, there is more to be gained for each
player from being credibly committed to a tough state of mind. Consequently, distortions
in the direction of greater toughness are likely to be increasingly adaptive as the size of
the subsidy increases, partially ‘cancelling out’ the salubrious effects of the subsidy. A
social planner must therefore ratchet the subsidy upwards even further to eventually
reach a state of first-best efficiency. Once this level of efficiency is attained, however,
expected social welfare is identical to that which would emerge under the benchmark
case.
In the above example, a subsidy of α∗∗ = 1
3
> 1
6
= α∗ is required to maximize both
players’ actual ex ante wealth when we take into account their endogenous dispositions.
The actual expected surplus upon introducing the subsidy will increase from 27
250
without
the subsidy, to 1
6
(which is the same as in the benchmark case). The equilibrium dispo-
sitions induced by the optimal subsidy grow to ε∗∗ = τ ∗∗ = 1
6
rather than the 1
10
which
would obtain without the external incentive.
4.1.2 Happiness-Maximizing Subsidies
Now consider the alternative case in which the social planner chooses a subsidy in order
to maximize the expected sum of the parties’ perceived level of happiness at the time of
bargaining. This objective corresponds to the following expression.
U (1− ε∗∗∗ − τ ∗∗∗)3 + V (1− ε∗∗∗ − τ ∗∗∗)3
where ε∗∗∗, τ ∗∗∗ correspond to the equilibrium preferences under the subsidy policy as
in proposition 1. As before, we restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms in which
U = V, so that each level of subsidy influence both players equally. Analysis of this
problem generates the following proposition (whose proof can be found in the appendix):
Proposition 4 With endogenous preferences, a happiness-maximizing social planner
will choose a subsidy of
α∗∗∗ =
1
6
9G− 4P
4P − 5G
which is smaller than the optimal subsidy in the benchmark case. The equilibrium dis-
positions under this subsidy are
ε∗∗∗ = τ ∗∗∗ = (1 + 2α∗∗∗)
2P − 3G
2P + 6 (P −G)
which are larger than those which would emerge without the subsidy.
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The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Just as in the previous case,
provision of a trade subsidy tends to exacerbate the equilibrium level of cognitive dispo-
sitions. Unlike that case, however, here the social planner’s objective mutates along with
the parties’ perceived level of happiness at the time of bargaining. Since increasing the
bargaining subsidy induces players to perceive that they are tougher bargainers (thereby
reducing perceived gains from trade), bargaining failure imposes a smaller social cost on
the parties. As a result, the optimal subsidy stops short of that in either the benchmark
case or the wealth-maximizing case.
In the running numerical example, maximizing happiness requires imposing a sub-
sidy of α∗∗∗ = 1
18
. This subsidy is clearly smaller than the optimal subsidy α∗ = 1
6
in the
benchmark case, and α∗∗ = 1
3
in the wealth-maximization case. The equilibrium disposi-
tions with the optimal subsidy α∗∗∗ will adjust, and increase to ε∗∗∗ = τ ∗∗∗ = 1
9
instead
of 1
10
without the subsidy. The expected happiness, given the maximizing subsidy, would
rise from G (1− τ ∗ − ε∗)3 = 9
125
without the subsidy to 16
27
P 3
(4P−5G)2 =
2
27
with it.
The following tables synthesize and compare the numerical example in the three
cases studied above: the first table compares the benchmark case (no dispositions) and
the wealth-maximizing case:
Benchmark Case
No dispositions
Maximizing
Wealth
Endogenous disposition
without subsidy
0 1
10
Expected surplus
without subsidy
9
64
27
250
Optimal subsidy 1
6
1
3
Endogenous disposition
with optimal subsidy
0 1
6
Expected surplus with
optimal subsidy
1
6
1
6
The second table compares the benchmark case (no dispositions) and the happiness-
maximizing case:
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Benchmark Case
No dispositions
Maximizing
Happiness
Endogenous disposition
without subsidy
0 1
10
Expected happiness
without subsidy
9
64
9
125
Optimal subsidy 1
6
1
18
Endogenous disposition
with optimal subsidy
0 1
9
Expected happiness with
optimal subsidy
1
6
2
27
Note once again from the third row in the tables that the optimal subsidy in the
benchmark case systematically diverges from that in either of the other two cases involv-
ing endogenous bias, falling short of the wealth-maximizing subsidy and exceeding the
happiness-maximizing subsidy. Moreover, note from the fourth row in the tables that
the equilibrium level of predicted toughness is not uniform across the two alternative
objectives, and is significantly higher in the case of maximizing wealth. These respective
differences exemplify our more general argument in this paper: That accounting for
the endogenous effects of regulation itself can lead to predictions that are distinct from
those that would be rendered if one either ignored cognitive biases or treated them as an
exogenous primitive.16
4.2 Interim Intervention: Efficient Bargaining Mechanisms
Another important arena for regulatory intervention comes at the interim stage, in the
design of bargaining procedures themselves. It is widely recognized in the literature
that bargaining protocols matter, in that they can produce distinct trading probabilities
and expected social payoffs. Consequently, the question of what constitutes an “optimal
bargaining mechanism” in a given circumstance continues to receive a significant amount
of attention. At the very least, the features of an optimal mechanism identify the limits
of what can be accomplished in an un-mediated bargaining (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991,
p. 290)). In this section, then, we explore optimal bargaining mechanisms, taking into
account endogenous dispositions.
At core, all bargaining mechanism specify both (1) the probability of trade for any pair
of valuations, and (2) the distribution of gains from trade that ensue from a transaction.
16Note also, by comparing the first and third entries of the last line of the table, that if both bargainers
were cold-blooded and incapable of developing cognitive distortions in the bargaining phase, they would
both be happier even under the best-suited subsidy intervention. Thus, even though these cognitive
distortions may be unilaterally beneficial (when the preferences of the other bargainer are taken as
given), their concurrent presence is socially destructive, just as in a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The institutional
intervention can amend this state of affairs, but to a limited extent.
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In conventional models no such mechanism can be considered optimal if there is an
alternative incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism that produces trade in
strictly more situations. As we shall see below, however, the introduction of endogenous
dispositions can sometimes cause the optimal mechanism to diverge from this general
principle. In particular, under certain conditions, an optimal mechanism may be much
more “draconian” than theory would otherwise predict, refusing to enforce transactions
in strictly fewer situations than other implementable mechanisms.
Interestingly, certain well-known doctrines operate in much the same fashion, and
can be interpreted (at least indirectly) as requiring some artificial lower bound in trade
surplus before a court is willing to enforce a contract. Notably, most of the protections are
limited to special cases, and contract law doctrine more generally is thought to implement
the principle that courts should act to facilitate transactions in the most circumstances
possible.
• Unconscionability: This doctrine instructs the court to refuse to enforce contracts in
situations where the negotiation and resulting terms of a transaction are excessively
one sided.17 One interpretation of the unconscionability doctrine is that it essen-
tially requires that each party receives some minimum surplus before a contract
can be enforced. Under such an interpretation, the doctrine implies a requirement
that the total amount of social surplus exceed some specified threshold before a
contract is enforceable.
• Moieties: In admiralty law, the common-law doctrine of moieties dictated the
division of rents from emergency salvage operations at sea. When, for instance, a
vessel in distress off-loaded its cargo onto another ship that had come to its aid,
the doctrine required that each party was to receive a “moiety” of a fixed fraction
(usually either 1
3
or 1
2
) of the value of the cargo as computed by its trading price
once sold on a commodities market.18 Because the moieties doctrine constrains
the feasible set of negotiated outcomes by fixing a price by reference to an external
market, it has the likely effect of discouraging transactions in the bilateral monopoly
setting where the gains from trade are positive, but insubstantial.
• Cooling off periods: A number of state and federal laws in the United States require
a specified period of time to pass before certain types of consumer contracts are
enforceable. In federal law, for example, statutory cooling off periods are required
for door-to-door sales (16 C.F.R. Part 429), telemarketing, (16 C.F.R. Parts 308,
17See, e.g., Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (refusing
enforcement of a cross-collateralization clause in a consumer debt contract that would operate to preclude
satisfaction on the debt of any single purchase until all purchases were paid off).
18See, e.g., Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. 150 (1856), in which a distressed vessel actually implemented
a competitive bidding process among three aspiring salvagers. The lowest bidder later successfully
challenged the terms of the contract under the doctrine of moeities, arguing that its accepted bid was
too low to ensure it of receiving its equitable share of the rents under the doctrine.
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310, & 435), and sales of business franchises (16 C.F.R. Secs. 436.1 et seq.). As
with unconscionability doctrine, one interpretation of a cooling off period is as a
doctrine that requires gains from trade to be relatively large. Indeed, where the
gains are small at the time of negotiation, it is relatively likely that small post-
transaction perturbations of the parties’ respective valuations can cause recision
of the agreement within the cooling off period. Knowing this, rational parties
might not find it in their interests to consummate deals that are likely to prove
unenforceable.
Given these examples, we now turn to consider the characteristics of an optimal
mechanism under endogenous biases. Such a mechanism is characterized by the pair of
functions (p(s, b),t(s, b)) where p(s, b) and t (s, b) denote the equilibrium probability of
trade and the equilibrium transfer payment, respectively, between a seller with a valuation
s, and a buyer with a valuation b.
Once again, as a benchmark we first specify the mechanism which maximizes the
players payoff assuming away the emergence of biases. As demonstrated by Myerson &
Satterthwaite (1983), the most efficient Incentive-Compatible (IC), Individually-Rational
(IR) and Budget-Balanced (BB) mechanism is one in which trade is prohibited unless
the seller’s and buyer’s stated valuations differ by at least 1
4
, i.e. a mechanism in such
that
p(s, b) =
½
1 b− s ≥ 1
4
0 b− s < 1
4
.
The mechanism presented in the example in section 2.2 is thus an optimal one. The
expected payoffs U, V of the bargainers might be different from one efficient mechanism
to another. On the other hand, in every such optimal mechanism the total surplus and
the expected probability of trade remain the same —
G =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(b− s) p(s, b)dsdb =
Z 1
1
4
Z b− 1
4
0
(b− s) dsdb = 9
64
P =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
p(s, b)dsdb =
Z 1
1
4
Z b− 1
4
0
dsdb =
9
32
4.2.1 Wealth-Maximizing Mechanisms
As before, we now consider how the introduction of endogenous dispositions affects the
analysis, focusing first on the social objective of maximizing the expected ex ante wealth
of the bargainers. Also as before, to facilitate intuitions, we restrict attention to the
symmetric case where U = V = 1
2
G . Under this formulation, the expected sum of seller
and buyer welfare is:
U (1− τ ∗ − ε∗)3 + P (1− τ ∗ − ε∗)2 ε∗
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where ε∗ and τ ∗ are the equilibrium biases from proposition 1. Analysis of the bargain-
ing design problem gives rise to the following proposition (whose proof appears in the
appendix):
Proposition 5 A Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983) mechanism with
p(s, b) =
½
1 b− s ≥ 1
4
0 b− s < 1
4
maximizes the expected wealth of the traders among all IC, IR and BB mechanisms, even
when the endogenous biases ε∗, τ ∗ from Proposition 1 are taken into account. When the
expected gains from trade are shared equally, the equilibrium dispositions are ε∗ = τ ∗ = 1
10
.
Interestingly, when the social planner is motivated by maximizing wealth, the efficient
mechanism permits trade only when the seller’s and buyer’s reported valuations differ by
at least 1
4
, exactly as in Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983).
Consequently every efficient mechanism as in Myerson-Satterthwaite is also efficient
in order to maximize wealth paternalistically among distorted bargainers.
4.2.2 Happiness-Maximizing Mechanisms
Suppose instead that the social planner were motivated by a desire to maximize happiness
rather than wealth. Under this alternative objective, the planner’s maximand becomes:
U (1− ε∗∗∗ − τ ∗∗∗)3
Where ε∗∗∗ and τ ∗∗∗ are the equilibrium biases from proposition 1. Analysis of this
problem yields the following proposition (whose proof appears in the appendix):
Proposition 6 The mechanism that maximizes the happiness of the players is charac-
terized by a threshold h∗∗∗ = 1
2
such that
p(s, b) =
½
1 b− s ≥ 1− h∗∗∗ = 1
2
0 b− s < 1− h∗∗∗ = 1
2
Such a mechanism induces trade in strictly fewer instances than the optimal mechanism in
the baseline case. The equilibrium dispositions under this mechanism are ε∗∗∗ = τ ∗∗∗ = 0.
Note that the optimal happiness-maximizing mechanism is a significantly more “dra-
conian” bargaining mechanism than that of either the baseline case or of the wealth-
maximizing, allowing trade if and only if the gains from trade (b− s) exceed 1
2
. The
intuition behind this result stems from a fundamental tradeoff that a restrictive mech-
anism creates. On the one hand, more restrictive trading mechanisms impose a direct
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welfare loss, since they reduce the likelihood of any trades. On the other hand, this
reduction in the likelihood of trade reduces the adaptiveness of a tough bargaining strat-
egy, since the size of the expected bargaining surplus is smaller. The result reported
in Proposition 6 reflects the fact that the latter effect swamps the former one for all
positive dispositions, so that an optimal trading rule coincides with the least restrictive
mechanism that completely vitiates all biases. Consequently, under this mechanism, no
biases ever evolve. It is easily verified that this mechanism yields a probability of trade
of P = 1
8
, and an average payoff per player of U = 1
24
.
Note also that unlike the previous examples, the happiness-maximizing mechanism
here is Pareto inferior to other candidates. For example, the Myerson-Satterthwaite
(1983) optimal mechanism is clearly implementable in the case of zero biases, and both
parties would prefer its implementation to the one given in the proposition. Allowing
them to do so, however, would cause the parties to evolve increasingly tough dispositions,
which in the long run would yield less trade and less ultimate happiness (as evaluated at
the time of trade). Consequently, implementing the happiness maximizing mechanism
would require courts to actively prohibit trade except in situations where the surplus is
sufficiently high. Many of the immutable legal doctrines discussed at the beginning of
this section attempt to do just that.
Finally, note that just as with subsidies, the maximand favored by the social planner
has a clear effect on the ultimate allocational rule. Maximizing wealth and maximizing
happiness lead to very different solutions.
4.3 Ex ante intervention: Property Rights
For our final application, we consider regulatory interventions that occur before bargain-
ing ever begins. Because transactions are little more than the transfer of property rights,
it can be substantially affected by calculated manipulations to the content of those ini-
tial property rights. Indeed, the use of divided property rights has already been cited
as a way to address problems of strategic barriers to trade (e.g., Cramton, Gibbons &
Klemperer (1987); Ayres & Talley (1995)).
Divided entitlements might, on first blush, appear exceptional within a capitalist
economy. But on closer inspection, one can find dozens of areas where either courts
or the parties themselves provide for divided property rights. Although a complete
description of such partial entitlements is too lengthy to articulate here, the following
represents a reasonable sampling:
• Outright Co-ownership: In trade secret law, the “shop rights” doctrine provides for
a type of divided ownership of inventions developed in the workplace. Explicitly,
when a rank-and-file employee uses company time and/or resources in developing a
new invention, the employee is awarded general ownership rights to the invention,
while the employer receives a non-exclusive, zero-price license to use the invention.
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Employers and employees are generally free to contract around the shop rights
doctrine, either prior to or after invention occurs (See Lester & Talley, 2000).
• Temporal/Subject Matter Divisions: In patent law, patentees are generally awarded
with a strong property right, but one that runs for only a prescribed, 20-year
statutory period after the effective filing date (or 17 years from the date of the grant)
(See 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120, 154(a)(2) (2002)). Viewed ex ante, this prospective
temporal division can be thought to convey payoffs whose present value is divided
between the patentee and its competitors who wish to use the patented technology.
Once again, patent law allows for contracting around this statutory entitlement
through licensing agreements.
• Legal Uncertainty: In business law, corporate fiduciaries are prohibited from ap-
propriating “corporate opportunities” – i.e., prospective business ventures that
rightfully belong to the firm – for their own personal use. The standards that
identify what exactly constitutes a bona fide corporate opportunity, however, are
inherently casuistic, leaving an obscure doctrine that has been alternatively charac-
terized by legal commentators as “vague,” “in transition,” “far from crystal clear,”
and “indecipherable” (see Talley (1998)). Although such randomness is generally
perceived as undesirable, it has the effect of endowing both the fiduciary and the
corporation with a probabilistic claim on the business opportunity, which has a
number of characteristics resembling joint ownership. Moreover, corporate law
generally allows for firms and their fiduciaries to allocate opportunities through
bargaining.
• Liability Rules: Even in the absence of a physical, temporal or probabilistic division
of property, legal rules can divide claims by altering the form of protection accorded
one’s entitlement. Much of modern nuissance law in the United States, for example,
tends to award a successful plaintiff with money damages rather than injunctive
relief for a defendant’s incompatible activities. As with the above examples, the
plaintiff and defendant are free to negotiate in the shadow of this liability rule (see
Ayres & Talley (1995)).
In order to consider the effect of divided entitlements on bargaining with dispositions,
suppose the parties bargained over ownership of an asset, but now assume that the initial
property rights of the asset are given by (q, 1 − q), where q represents the fractional
ownership claimed by B, and (1− q) represent that claimed by S. Without loss of
generality, suppose that q ≤ 1
2
. Following Ayres & Talley (1995) we explore what is the
optimal allocation (i.e. what is the optimal q) that maximizes the expected surplus in
case the partners wish to dissolve the partnership, but we now factor in the possibility
of endogenous cognitive dispositions.
As a benchmark, we once again consider first the case in which no biases exist, and we
explore a specific bargaining procedure: a sealed-bid double auction as the procedure to
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dissolve the partnership: Each of the partners submits a bid for the asset, and the partner
with the higher bid buys her partner’s share in the asset at the price (for the entire asset)
which is the average of the two bids. Such a procedure with a linear-strategy equilibrium
is known to be optimal in a Myerson-Satterthwaite framework with symmetric, uniform
distributions of valuation.
As in section 3.1, we therefore explore an equilibrium with linear bidding strategies.
These turn to be
rB(b) =
½
2
3
b+ 1
12
+ 1
6
q when 1
4
− 1
2
q ≤ b ≤ 1
1
4
− 1
6
q when 0 ≤ b < 1
4
− 1
2
q
(4.3)
rS(s) =
½
2
3
s+ 1
4
− 1
6
q when 0 ≤ s ≤ 3
4
+ 1
2
q
3
4
+ 1
6
q when 3
4
+ 1
2
q < s ≤ 1 (4.4)
(of which the Chatterjee-Samuelson (1983) equilibrium in section 3.1 is the limiting case
for q = 019). Analysis of these expressions leads to the following proposition for the
benchmark case of no dispositions (whose proof appears in the appendix):
Proposition 7 In the absence of dispositions, the expected surplus in this double auction
equilibrium is maximized with the initial shares (q, 1− q) =
¡
1
2
, 1
2
¢
. The asset will always
end up in the hands of the partner who values it most.
The fact that the optimal property rights scheme in the baseline case allocates equal
ownership shares to each player should not be surprising. Indeed, in this case, the only
impediment to a negotiated outcome is the parties’ incentives to extract information
rents by misstating their true valuations. Buyers tend to shade their private valuations
downwards, while sellers tend to shade theirs upwards. A division of property rights
tends to weaken these incentives, by making each player both a potential buyer and a
potential seller. The introduction of these dual roles causes the players to become more
ambivalent about whether to shade their valuations (and in which direction to do so).
When each side has a one-half initial ownership share of the asset, the incentives to
over-state and under-state exactly cancel one another out, thereby leading to first-best
efficiency.
4.3.1 Wealth-Maximizing Property Rights
We now consider how a social planner might maximize surplus in the presence of en-
dogenous cognitive dispositions. To understand how biases alter the analysis, first fix q
19The only difference is that in the Chaterjee-Samuelson (1983) case (q = 0), no trade takes place
when 0 ≤ b < 14−
1
2q or
3
4+
1
2q < s ≤ 1 with either the equilibrium strategies (3.3), (3.4) or alternatively
(4.1), (4.2). However, when q > 0 and 0 ≤ b < 14 −
1
2q, the partner with share q is certain to sell its part
in the partnership at equilibrium, and will therefore bid the lowest equilibrium bid of its partner, and
not below it. Similarly, when 34 +
1
2q < s ≤ 1, the partner with share 1− q is certain to buy its partner’s
part, and will therefore bid the highest equilibrium bid of its partner, and not above it.
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and consider only how dispositions are likely to evolve. As above, suppose that player
S misperceives her valuation to be ε higher than it actually is, while B similarly misper-
ceives his valuation to be τ lower than it actually is. Consequently, when the partners
begin to negotiate, they observe each other’s character (i.e. the supports [ε, 1 + ε] and
[−τ , 1−τ ] of the distributions become common knowledge), but not the actual perceived
valuations. Then they play the equilibrium where the bids rB, rS are linear in their
perceived valuations. When translated back to their actual valuations, these equilibrium
bids turn to be
rB(b) =
½
2
3
b+ 1
12
+ 1
6
q + 1
4
ε− 3
4
τ when x ≤ b ≤ 1
1
4
− 1
6
q + 3
4
ε− 1
4
τ when 0 ≤ b < x (4.5)
rS(s) =
½
2
3
s+ 1
4
− 1
6
q + 3
4
ε− 1
4
τ when 0 ≤ s ≤ 1− x
3
4
+ 1
6
q + 1
4
ε− 3
4
τ when 1− x < s ≤ 1 (4.6)
where
x =
1
4
− 1
2
q +
3
4
(ε+ τ). (4.7)
Analysis of these bid functions yields the following proposition (whose proof can be found
in the appendix):
Proposition 8 In the double auction with a given value of q, the equilibrium dispositions
of the parties are
ε∗ = τ ∗ =
3
10
+
1
3
q − 1
15
p
(9 + 80q).
Expected wealth is maximized when the initial entitlements are fixed at (q, 1− q) = (1
2
, 1
2
),
so that
ε∗ = τ ∗ = 0
Proposition 7 illustrates that a wealth-maximizing property rights division under
endogenous cognitive biases is identical to that in the baseline case: each party receives
a one-half ownership share in the asset. This result suggests that there may be at
least some forms of regulatory intervention that can address both strategic barriers to
trade and cognitive barriers to trade simultaneously. Indeed, not only does divided
ownership dampen information rents (as is well known in the literature), but Proposition
7 demonstrates that it can also dampen the returns to developing a toughness disposition.
When the parties could ultimately be either buyers or sellers of the asset, there is little to
be gained from being committed to a set of preferences that biases one’s valuation either
upwards or downwards. Consequently, the allocation of equal shares (q, 1− q) =
¡
1
2
, 1
2
¢
both maximizes the players wealth and also induces an equilibrium with no cognitive
dispositions.
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4.3.2 Happiness-Maximizing Property Rights
The intuition developed in Proposition 7 turns out to be quite general. In fact, not
only does an initial property right division maximize expected wealth, but it also turns
out to be the optimal property rights allocation when the social planner’s objective is
to maximize happiness, as reflected in the following proposition (whose proof is in the
appendix):
Proposition 9 In the double auction with a given value of q, expected happiness is max-
imized when the initial entitlements are fixed at (q, 1− q) = (1
2
, 1
2
), so that
ε∗ = τ ∗ = 0
Recall that in the ex-post and interim cases (studied above), the optimal regulatory
intervention hinged crucially on the objective function of the social planner, and in partic-
ular whether she was motivated by maximizing “wealth” or “hapiness.” Here, in contrast,
an ex ante intervention towards evenly divided property rights turns out to be optimal
under both criteria as well as under the baseline case. Moreover, such a division has
the effect of completely debiasing the players, so that they no longer develop cognitive
distortions in the course of bargaining. This prediction squares nicely with some recent
experimental work (e.g., Rachlinsky & Journden (1998)), in which endowment effects
appear to dissipate when parties’ interests are protected by weaker entitlements (such as
liability rules).
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a framework for designing optimal institutions in the presence
of endogenous cognitive dispositions. This is a critically important problem if one wishes
to draw meaningful policy implications from behavioral economics. At the same time,
however, it is a problem that involves at least two unique complicating factors which are
largely absent in conventional institutional design problems. First, the existence and size
of cognitive biases may themselves be sensitive to the very institutional policies designed
to address them. In such situations, policymakers must be keenly aware of the feedback
effects that any candidate mechanism is likely to foster, and anticipate how cognition and
regulatory context are likely to interact. Second, the very definition of “optimality” may
be even more contestable when preference are endogenous. Policies designed to maximize
wealth (i.e., welfare defined in terms of a-contextual preferences) need not coincide with
those designed to maximize happiness (i.e., welfare defined in terms of the preferences
induced within the institutional design). Consequently, policymakers may be forced to
choose between these alternative objectives, since they generally will not produce the
same policy prescriptions.
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To illustrate our claims, we considered three families of regulatory intervention that
have real-world institutional counterparts: ex post, interim and ex-ante interventions in
bilateral trade. Within these contexts, we have demonstrated how a failure to appreciate
the complicating factors noted above can lead to unintended and undesirable institutional
structures. In the context of ex post intervention, the optimal trade subsidy that incor-
porates evolutionary biases always diverges from the “baseline” case in which biases are
ignored, regardless of the social objective adopted. In particular, wealth maximization
requires a larger subsidy relative to the baseline, while happiness maximization requires a
smaller one. Moreover we have shown that an ex post intervention (of any size) induces
the players to have even larger perception biases.
For interim interventions, the optimal trading mechanism in the baseline case turns
out to be identical to that of a wealth-maximizing mechanism with biases. On the
other hand, the trading mechanism that maximizes the players’ happiness turns out to
be relatively “draconian” in nature, prohibiting trade in strictly more circumstances than
other implementable bargaining mechanisms would. Implementing such a Pareto-inferior
mechanism would likely necessitate the implementation of immutable rules (such as that
found in the doctrines of unconscionability or moeities).
Most optimistically, we find that ex ante regulation through property rights alloca-
tions may be the most flexible and promising of all the interventions studied (at least
within our framework). Here, the optimal allocation entails divided ownership, award-
ing half of the entitlement to each player. This allocation remains optimal regardless
of whether the objective is to maximize wealth or happiness, and of whether we take
the biases into account. Moreover, such a regulatory scheme completely de-biases the
players, eventually eliminating their evolutionary dispositions.
Although it is our motivating story, bilateral trade is likely not to be the sole arena
in which the interplay between policy, context and preferences is important. There are
already several other attempts to address similar issues in other contexts.20 Indeed,
the approach suggested here may be relevant in virtually every instance of market or
institutional design, and hence suggests a promising direction for further research.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
It is enough to prove the second part of the proposition. If the dispositions are indeed
the equilibrium dispositions we have
g (ε∗, τ ∗) =
4P 3(2P −G)
(4P − 3G)3
20Bar-Gill and Fershtman 2001, Fershtman and Heifetz 2002
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From proposition 1 we have the conditions P
U
> 3 and P
V
> 3 and thus P
G
> 3
2
. We also
assume P
G
≤ 2 since we restrict our attention to mechanisms which are both (IC) and
(IR) (see footnote 10). Finally, g (ε∗, τ ∗) is indeed smaller than G for 3
2
< P
G
≤ 2.¥
Proof of Proposition 3:
In the case of a subsidy α the equilibrium dispositions for the parties are given by
εα = (1 + 2α)
P − 3U
P + 3 (P −G) (A.1)
for the seller, and
τα = (1 + 2α)
P − 3V
P + 3 (P −G) (A.2)
for the buyer: From Proposition 1, the endogenous toughness is of size ε∗ = P−3U
P+3(P−G)
and τ ∗ = P−3V
P+3(P−G) of the length of the interval, which is now 1 + 2α instead of 1.
Thus the actual bargaining interval is of length
Lsub = (1 + 2α− εα − τα) =
µ
1− 2P − 3G
P + 3 (P −G)
¶
(1 + 2α) (A.3)
The actual expected wealth is
fseller =
£
U (Lsub)
3 + P (Lsub)
2
εα
¤
− P (Lsub)2 α (A.5)
for the seller and
fbuyer =
£
V (Lsub)
3 + P (Lsub)
2
τα
¤
− P (Lsub)2 α (A.6)
for the buyer: The first term in fseller and fbuyer is computed as in (3.5) and (3.6),
respectively; and the second term is the per-capita tax that each of the traders has to
pay in advance in order to finance the expected subsidy. The wealth-maximizing subsidy
is therefore
α∗∗ = argmax
α
£
G (Lsub)
3 + P (Lsub)
2 (εα + τα)− 2P (Lsub)2 α
¤
=
1
6
P
P −G (A.7)
Since we assume throughout that P
G
> 3
2
then indeed
α∗∗ ≥ α∗ = 1
6
3G− P
P −G
The resulting dispositions ε∗∗ = τ ∗∗ will be larger by a factor of (1 + 2α∗∗) relative to the
dispositions α∗ = τ ∗ without the subsidy. Finally, the eventual expected surplus is
G (Lsub)
3 + P (Lsub)
2 (ε∗∗ + τ ∗∗)− 2P (Lsub)2 α∗∗ =
4P 3
27 (G− P )2
,
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the same as (4.2) in the benchmark case. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4:
The computation of the dispositions εα, τα and the relevant interval size Lsub is
the same as in (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) above. However, when maximizing the ex-
pected happiness of the traders during trade rather than their expected wealth, the
term P (Lsub)
2 (εα + τα) in (A.7) should be omitted from the maximand, since this is
the extra expected gains from trade that the biased bargainers do not see in the heat of
bargaining. The optimal subsidy is therefore
α∗∗∗ = argmax
α
£
G (Lsub)
3 − 2P (Lsub)2 α
¤
=
1
6
9G− 4P
4P − 5G (A.8)
which is indeed smaller than the optimal subsidy α∗ in (4.2) in the benchmark case for
the relevant range P
G
> 3
2
. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5:
Denote x = 2P
G
. From proposition 1 we have
ε∗ = τ ∗ =
x− 3
x+ 3(x− 2)
From (3.7) the expected surplus is
g (ε∗, τ ∗) = G
µ
1− 2 x− 3
x+ 3(x− 2)
¶3
+2P
µ
1− 2 x− 3
x+ 3(x− 2)
¶2µ
x− 3
x+ 3(x− 2)
¶
= G
x3 (x− 1)
4 (2x− 3)3
(A.9)
In the relevant range in which P
G
≥ 3
2
, and the trade mechanism is also (IC), (IR) and
(BB) (see footnote 10) and hence P
G
≤ 2, we have x = 2P
G
∈ [3, 4]. In this range x
3(x−1)
4(2x−3)3
is a decreasing function of x.
Let
G∗ =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
µZ 1
0
(b− s) p∗(s, b)dsdb
¶
be the average surplus in the wealth-maximizing mechanism when normalized back to
the [0, 1]× [0, 1] domain, and
P ∗ =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
p∗(s, b)dsdb
be the average probability of trade in that mechanism. From (A.9) we know that among
all mechanisms with an average surplus G∗, in the wealth-maximizing one the expres-
sion x
3(x−1)
4(2x−3)3 is maximal. Since this expression is decreasing, in the wealth-maximizing
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mechanism x = 2P
∗
G∗ is minimal in the range [3, 4]. We thus have to solve the problem
min
p:[0,1]×[0,1]→[0,1]
·Z 1
0
Z 1
0
p(b, s)dsdb
¸
s.t.
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
(b− s) p(b, s)dsdb = G∗
The Lagrangian is
L =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
[(1− µ(b− s)) p(b, s)]dsdb
and thus the first order condition gives
p∗(b, s) =
½
1 b− s ≥ 1
µ
0 b− s < 1
µ
This means that there is a threshold h∗ ∈ [0, 1] for which
p∗(s, b) =
½
1 b− s ≥ 1− h∗
0 b− s < 1− h∗
This implies that
G∗ =
Z h∗
0
µZ 1
s+1−h∗
(b− s) db
¶
ds =
1
6
h∗2 (3− 2h∗) ,
P ∗ =
Z h∗
0
µZ 1
s+1−h∗
db
¶
ds =
1
2
h∗2
and
x∗ =
2P ∗
G∗
=
6
(3− 2h∗) .
Since x∗ ∈ [3, 4] we conclude that h∗ ∈
£
1
2
, 3
4
¤
. The optimal threshold h∗ thus satisfies
h∗ = arg max
h∈[ 12 ,
3
4 ]
·
G
x3 (x− 1)
4 (2x− 3)3
¸
= arg max
h∈[ 12 ,
3
4 ]
·
1
3
(3 + 2h)
h2
(1 + 2h)3
¸
=
3
4
¥
Proof of Proposition 6:
The expected happiness of the traders during trade is the first term in (A.9)
G
µ
1− 2 x− 3
x+ 3(x− 2)
¶3
= G
µ
x
2x− 3
¶3
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and
¡
x
2x−3
¢3
is a decreasing function in the relevant range x ∈ [3, 4]. Thus the same
argument as in the proof of proposition 5 suggests that the happiness-maximizing mech-
anism would also be “draconian”, allowing for trade only if the gains from trade exceed
a threshold 1− h∗∗, where
h∗∗ = arg max
h∈[ 12 ,
3
4 ]
"
G
µ
x
2x− 3
¶3#
= arg max
h∈[ 12 ,
3
4 ]
·
2
3
(3− 2h) h
2
(1 + 2h)3
¸
=
1
2
¥
Proof of Proposition 7:
Whenever the bidding is not extreme (i.e. 1
4
− 1
2
q ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ s ≤ 3
4
+ 1
2
q), the
trading price for the entire asset is
p(s, b) =
rS(s, b) + rB(s, b)
2
=
1
3
(s+ b) +
1
6
By (4.3) and (4.4). For q ∈ [0, 1
2
], the overall expected payoffs of each of the players is
the sum of the expected payoffs in 5 mutually exclusive and exhaustive regions:
1) When B gets the entitlement i.e. rB > rS (this can only happen when the bids are
not extreme i.e. 1
4
− 1
2
q ≤ b ≤ 1, 0 ≤ s ≤ 3
4
+ 1
2
q and b− s > 1
4
− 1
2
q)
2) When S gets the entitlement (i.e. rS ≥ rB) and
2a) Bids are not extreme i.e. 1
4
− 1
2
q ≤ b ≤ 1, 0 ≤ s ≤ 3
4
+ 1
2
q and rS ≥ rB ⇔
b− s ≤ 1
4
− 1
2
q
2b) Only the bid of B is extreme i.e. 0 ≤ b < 1
4
− 1
2
q and 0 ≤ s ≤ 3
4
+ 1
2
q
2c) Both bids are extreme i.e. 0 ≤ b < 1
4
− 1
2
q and 3
4
+ 1
2
q < s ≤ 1
2d) Only the bid of S is extreme i.e. 1
4
− 1
2
q ≤ b ≤ 1 and 3
4
+ 1
2
q < s ≤ 1
Denote by πB,πS the expected payoffs of B and S in this equilibrium.
πS =
Z 3
4
+ 1
2
q
0
Z 1
s+1
4
− 1
2
q
((1− q)(p(s, b)− s) dbds+
Z 3
4
+1
2
q
0
Z s+ 1
4
− 1
2
q
1
4
−1
2
q
q (s− p(s, b)) dbds
+
Z 3
4
+1
2
q
0
Z 1
4
−1
2
q
0
q
µ
s− 1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q
¶
+
µ
2
3
s+
1
4
− 1
6
q
¶¶¶
dbds
+
Z 1
3
4
+ 1
2
q
Z 1
4
− 1
2
q
0
q
µ
s− 1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q
¶¶¶
dbds
+
Z 1
3
4
+ 1
2
q
Z 1
1
4
− 1
2
q
q
µ
s− 1
2
µµ
2
3
b+
1
12
+
1
6
q
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q
¶¶¶
dbds
=
3
64
q − 1
32
q2 − 1
48
q3 +
9
128
32
Due to symmetry we will also have
πB =
3
64
q − 1
32
q2 − 1
48
q3 +
9
128
The initial allocation which maximizes the average surplus is therefore
q∗ = arg max
q∈[0, 1
2
]
[πS + πB] =
1
2
¥
Proof of Proposition 8:
Whenever the bidding is not extreme (i.e. x ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1− x, where x is
defined by (4.7) ), the trading price for the entire asset is
p(s, b) =
rS(s, b) + rB(s, b)
2
=
1
3
(s+ b) +
1
6
+
1
2
ε− 1
2
τ
by (4.5) and (4.6). For q ∈ [0, 1
2
], the overall expected payoffs of each of the players is
again the sum of the expected payoffs in 5 mutually exclusive and exhaustive regions:
1) When B gets the entitlement i.e. rB > rS (this can only happen when the bids are
not extreme i.e. x ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1− x and b− s > x)
2) When S gets the entitlement (i.e. rS ≥ rB) and
2a) Bids are not extreme i.e. x ≤ b ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1− x and rs ≥ rb ⇔ b− s ≤ x
2b) Only the bid of B is extreme i.e. 0 ≤ b < x and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1− x
2c) Both bids are extreme i.e. 0 ≤ b < x and 1− x < s ≤ 1
2d) Only the bid of S is extreme i.e. x ≤ b ≤ 1 and 1− x < s ≤ 1
Denote by fB(ε, τ), fS(ε, τ) the actual ex ante payoffs (not the perceived ones!) of B
and S in this equilibrium.
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fS(ε, τ) =
Z 1−x
0
Z 1
s+x
((1− q)(p(s, b)− s) dbds+
Z 1−x
0
Z s+x
x
q (s− p(s, b)) dbds
+
Z 1−x
0
Z x
0
q
µ
s− 1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶
+
µ
2
3
s+
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶¶¶
dbds
+
Z 1
1−x
Z x
0
q
µ
s− 1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶¶¶
dbds
+
Z 1
1−x
Z 1
x
q
µ
s− 1
2
µµ
2
3
b+
1
12
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶¶¶
dbds
= − 1
384
(1− q) (β − 6(1 + ε− τ))β2 − 1
96
q (3ε− q)β2 + 1
48
q (3ε− q)β (β − 4)
+
1
128
q (β + 4(τ − ε)) (β − 4)2 − 1
192
qβ (β − 6(ε− τ)) (β − 4)
where β(q, ε, τ) = 2q + 3(1− ε− τ)
fB(ε, τ) =
Z 1−x
0
Z 1
s+x
((1− q)(b− p(s, b)) dbds+
Z 1−x
0
Z s+x
x
q (p(s, b)− b) dbds
+
Z 1−x
0
Z x
0
q
µ
1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶
+
µ
2
3
s+
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶¶
− b
¶
dbds
+
Z 1
1−x
Z x
0
q
µ
1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶¶
− b
¶
dbds
+
Z 1
1−x
Z 1
x
q
µ
1
2
µµ
2
3
b+
1
12
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶¶
− b
¶
dbds
= − 1
384
(1− q) (β − 6(1− ε+ τ))β2 + 1
96
q (q − 3τ)β2 − 1
192
qβ (β + 6(ε− τ)) (β − 4)
+
1
128
q (β + 4(ε− τ)) (β − 4)2 − 1
48
q (q − 3τ) (β − 4)β
The reaction functions in the game with payoff functions fS, fB are
τ(ε) = argmax
τ
fB(ε, τ) =
14
27
q − 5
9
ε+
5
9
− 4
27
p
(q2 − 6εq + 42q + 9ε2 − 18ε+ 9)
ε(τ) = argmax
ε
fS(ε, τ) =
14
27
q − 5
9
τ +
5
9
− 4
27
p
(q2 − 6τq + 42q + 9τ 2 − 18τ + 9)
This game is dominance-solvable, with the equilibrium biases
ε∗ = τ ∗ =
µ
3
10
+
1
3
q − 1
15
p
(9 + 80q)
¶
(A.10)
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Here is the graph of ε∗ = τ ∗ as a function of q where (q, 1−q) are the initial entitlements:
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5q
We can see that the biases ε∗ = τ ∗ tend to zero as the initial shares (q, 1 − q) tend to
(1
2
, 1
2
).Thus in a case of equally shared property rights in the asset no biases will emerge.
Knowing the endogenous extent of the dispositions as a function of q, the surplus-
maximizing initial allocations are defined by
q∗ = arg max
q∈[0, 1
2
]
[fS(ε
∗, τ ∗) + fB(ε
∗, τ ∗)]
= arg max
q∈[0, 1
2
]
·
1
500
µ
80q +
µ
9− 40
3
q
¶p
80q + 9 + 27
¶¸
=
1
2
¥
Proof of Proposition 9:
The expected perceived payoffs (happiness) of S and B are
hS(ε, τ) =
Z 1−x
0
Z 1
s+x
((1− q)(p(s, b)− (s− ε)) dbds+
Z 1−x
0
Z s+x
x
q (s− ε− p(s, b)) dbds
+
Z 1−x
0
Z x
0
q
µ
s− ε− 1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶
+
µ
2
3
s+
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶¶¶
dbds
+
Z 1
1−x
Z x
0
q
µ
s− ε− 1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶¶¶
dbds
+
Z 1
1−x
Z 1
x
q
µ
s− ε− 1
2
µµ
2
3
b+
1
12
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶¶¶
dbds
= fS(ε, τ) +
1
2
ε (1− 2q + x(x− 2))
and
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hB(ε, τ) =
Z 1−x
0
Z 1
s+x
((1− q)(b+ τ − p(s, b)) dbds+
Z 1−x
0
Z s+x
x
q (p(s, b)− (b+ τ)) dbds
+
Z 1−x
0
Z x
0
q
µ
1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶
+
µ
2
3
s+
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶¶
− (b+ τ)
¶
dbds
+
Z 1
1−x
Z x
0
q
µ
1
2
µµ
1
4
− 1
6
q +
3
4
ε− 1
4
τ
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶¶
− (b+ τ)
¶
dbds
+
Z 1
1−x
Z 1
x
q
µ
1
2
µµ
2
3
b+
1
12
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶
+
µ
3
4
+
1
6
q +
1
4
ε− 3
4
τ
¶¶
− (b+ τ)
¶
dbds
= fB(ε, τ) +
1
2
τ (1− 2q + x(x− 2))
respectively, where x = 1
4
− 1
2
q + 3
4
(ε+ τ) as before.
As the endogenous extent of the dispositions ε∗, τ ∗ as a function of q is as in (A.10),
the happiness-maximizing initial allocations are defined by
q∗∗ = arg max
q∈[0, 1
2
]
[hS(ε
∗∗, τ ∗∗) + hB(ε
∗∗, τ ∗∗)]
= arg max
q∈[0, 1
2
]
·
1
750
³
−345q − 300q2 + (18 + 55q)
p
80q + 9 + 54
´¸
=
1
2
¥
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